5369: Reading Responses 9/1
In case you're wondering, this is my blog from 5060 last year, cleverly repurposed because I don't have time to set up something else at the moment.
Brunge
I’m amused that Bunge puts psychoanalysis on the same level as astrology, alchemy, and garbage-in-garbage-out computing. But that’s neither here nor there.
Reading this piece is actually fairly shocking after a year of authors who take ideas like the social construction of knowledge for granted. In trying to describe a philosophy of technology, Bunge apparently intends to use his concept of the technological worldview as a transformative algorithm: he punches in classical philosophical questions and describes the output. Thus he gives us the epistemology, metaphysics, value orientation, and ethics of technology. It’s a thoroughly modernist thought experiment, and it’s hard to imagine that Bunge did not realize how much his own assumptions fed the process.
I almost wonder if that was, in a way, the point. It’s come up in both my other classes this semester that members of applied science communities have tended to be among the most resistant to postmodern accounts of knowledge and language, particularly that language creates knowledge. Surely technology, which allows us to reshape the world around us in beneficial and predictable ways, is a safe bastion from all that social constructionist nonsense that gives all that formative power to words. Bunge even remarks that metaphysics, discredited in philosophy proper, finds a home among technologists (177). Since technology is cutting-edge, and since he can attribute his positions to technology, his positions must not be obsolete, at least not where they really matter.
Ellul
I first encountered the idea of technological determinism last year in Foundations of Tech Comm. At the time, I didn’t think I quite understood it. I’m still not sure I fully do, but Ellul’s definitions help.
Ellul offers an interesting sociological account of human history in the twin ideas of technique and determinism. Technique is, in summary, the sum of practical human knowledge that describes the best way we know how to get by. Determinism describes the structures and forces, however complex, that compel humanity as a species or a community in a certain historical direction. However, rather than casting these forces as primarily external, Ellul links technique and determinism, as the sociological structures that the human race develops inevitably influence and interpret human decisions. As technique changes through human history, so do the various determinants that shape human actions. Ellul views technological progress as deterministic in itself; unchecked, it will drive the human race toward an inevitable end, the one he presumably describes in the rest of his book. However, individual humans may resist the determinants forced upon them, or at least they may choose among the forces that determine their actions. This, for Ellul, is the concept of freedom.
Shrader-Frechette
This treatment of technology and ethics is short but thought-provoking. Shrader-Frechette begins, appropriately, with the Aristotelian notion that new capabilities raise new ethical questions, and it is the newness of technology that chiefly drives her inquiry into ethical positions on it. What are the ethical responsibilities of a society plunging headlong into new technologies which are, by definition, unknown? How is it ethical to weigh risks and benefits when we cannot even begin to quantify those risks and benefits (and is a risk-benefit analysis appropriate in such a situation)? When dealing with dangerous technology, what constitutes informed consent concerning occupational (or residential) hazards when understanding those hazards requires advanced and esoteric training? While this article is only introductory, it serves as an effective introduction to some of the more nebulous areas of technology and ethics.
